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Dhooghe: A Purchaser for Resale Is a Consumer Protected by DTPA.

TRADE REGULATION-DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICESCONSUMER PROTECTION ACT-A Purchaser for Resale
is a Consumer Protected by DTPA
Big H Auto Auction v. Saenz Motors,
665 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. 1984).
In 1978, Saenz Motors purchased two automobiles for resale from Big H
Auto Auction.' Big H furnished Saenz Motors with certified copies of the
Texas certificates of title, explaining the substitution was due to the loss of
the originals.' When the purchasers from Saenz Motors were informed by
the Department of Public Safety that the two automobiles were stolen vehicles, Saenz Motors requested the return of the purchase price from Big
H.3 Upon Big H's refusal, Saenz Motors brought suit under the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA).4 The trial
court held that Saenz Motors was not a consumer because the automobiles
were "purchased for resale," and, therefore, the court denied Saenz Motors
DTPA protection.' The Texas Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth
Supreme Judicial District at Corpus Christi reversed in part, concluding
that Saenz Motors was a "consumer" and could recover under the DTPA.6
Big H filed an application for writ of error to the Texas Supreme Court.7
Held-Affirmed A purchaser for resale is a "consumer" because the resale

1. See Big H Auto Auction v. Saenz Motors, 665 S.W.2d 756, 756 (Tex. 1984). Big H is

an automobile auctioneer, and Saenz Motors is a used car dealer. See Saenz Motors v. Big
H Auto Auction, 653 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983), aff'd, 665 S.W.2d
756 (Tex. 1984).
2. See Big H Auto Auction v. Saenz Motors, 665 S.W.2d 756, 756 (Tex. 1984).
3. See id at 756. This demand was made subsequent to a hearing held to determine
ownership. See Saenz Motors v. Big H Auto Auction, 653 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1983), afl'd 665 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. 1984).
4. See Saenz Motors v. Big H Auto Auction, 653 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1983) (action brought for breach of implied warranty of title pursuant to TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 2.312 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) and id § 17.50(a)(2) (Vernon Supp.
1984)), aff'd, 665 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. 1984).
5. See id at 524.
6. See id. at 525. The decision was based on the intended public policy of the legislature "to protect the innocent purchaser, and not to shield the seller from an action to recover
for breach of an implied warranty of title." See id. at 525.
7. See Big H Auto Auction v. Saenz Motors, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 499, 501 (July 7, 1983).
The application was granted by the court on Oct. 5, 1983. See Big H Auto Auction v. Saenz
Motors, 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1, 2 (Oct. 8, 1983).
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of goods isa "use" within the DTPA's definition of "goods."'
In 1906, the promulgation of the Uniform Sales Act by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws triggered the first
state statutory enactments having an impact upon consumer protection. 9
More recently, increased awareness of the need for better consumer protection has resulted in the inclusion of consumer oriented provisions throughout the Uniform Commercial Code,' ° the Federal Trade Commission
Act,"I and the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act,' 2 in addition to local con-

8. See Big H Auto Auction v. Saenz Motors, 665 S.W.2d 756, 758-59 (Tex. 1984) (cause
of action arose under 1977 version of DTPA; still applicable under present law).
9. SeeUNIF. SALES ACT § 15, 1 U.L.A. 213 (act withdrawn 1966). The Uniform Sales
Act was adopted by approximately two-thirds of the jurisdictions. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1,at 2-3 (2d ed. 1980). This statutory protection was
essentially a codification of existing common law and a copy of the English Sales of Goods
Act. See R.

DICKERSON,

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

AND

THE FOOD CONSUMER

§

1.12, at 44 &

n.2 (1951) (§ 15(1), (2) contained the warranties of fitness and merchantability). Under the
English Sales of Goods Act the consumer was allowed to avail himself of "implied warranties in sales transactions." See Comment, Continuing the Common Law Response to the New
IndustrialState. The Extension of Enterprise Liability to Consumer Services, 22 UCLA L.
REV. 401, 408 & n.24 (1974) (citing English Sales of Goods Act of 1894). Prior to this act,
the common law implied warranties did not cover consumer retail transactions, but were
only extended to wholesale dealers because their transactions were mostly conducted over
long distances. See id.
at 407. Nevertheless, it appears that before the adoption of the English Sales of Goods Act consumers were protected by an implied warranty in transactions
involving retail of food for immediate consumption. See R. DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER § 1.1, at 19 (1951).
10. U.C.C. § 1-101 (1978). The Uniform Commercial Code, a revision of the Uniform
Sales Act, has been enacted with minor variations in the District of Columbia and all states
except Louisiana. SeeJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § i, at 1 (2d
ed. 1980). In regard to consumer oriented provisions within the Texas version of the UCC, a
purchaser can beta consumer "if he purchases goods primarily for personal, family or household purposes." See TEX. Bus. & COM.CODE ANN. § 9.109(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp.
1984). Sections 2.312 through 2.318 provide for express as well as implied warranties of title,
of merchantability, and of fitness for a particular purpose arising out of usage of trade and
against infringement by the buyer. See id §§ 2.312-.318 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The
UCC is of further importance to the consumer because every obligation or transaction under
article 2 entails a good faith requirement in the performance and enforcement of a contract.
See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.203 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968); see also Cohan, The
Rights and Duties of Retail Merchants Under State Consumer Protection Laws. Emergent
Doctrines and Strategies of the Defense, 18 NEW ENG, L. REV. 297, 305 (1982-1983). The
good faith requirement for a merchant is defined as "honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE

ANN. § 2.103(a)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Salois v. Mutual of OmahaIns. Co., 581 P.2d
1349, 1351 (Wash. 1978) held that a merchant's breach of his duty of good faith and fair
dealing constitutes an unfair and deceptive practice. See Cohan, The Rights and Duties of
RetailMerchants Under State Consumer ProtectionLaws.. Emergent Doctrines andStrategies
of the Defense, 18 NEW ENG. L. REV. 297, 305 & n.62 (1982-1983).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1982). No private right of action is provided by the Federal

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol16/iss2/9

2

Dhooghe: A Purchaser for Resale Is a Consumer Protected by DTPA.

1985]

CASENOTES

sumer protection acts.' 3 Texas attempted to satisfy this need with the 1967
enactment of the Texas Interest--Consumer Credit and Consumer Protection Act,' 4 the immediate precursor of the DTPA. 15 Under the Texas Interest-Consumer Credit and Consumer Protection Act, consumer
protection was precarious because it failed to provide for a private cause of

Trade Commission (FTC) Act; therefore, the Act is "of limited utility in determining
whether the consumer is entitled to damages." See Cohan, The Rights and Duties fRetail
Merchants Under State Consumer ProtectionLaws.- Emergent DoctrinesandStrategies ofthe
Defense, 18 NEw ENG. L. REv. 297, 302 (1982-1983). Under the Act, the FTC has the duty
to regulate "the advertising and sale of goods and services" in order to protect the consumer.
See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied,415 U.S. 951 (1974). The FTC can promulgate interpretative rules as well as general
statements of policy regarding unfair and deceptive acts and practices. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a
(1982). These interpretative rules have the effect of substantive law. See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,415 U.S. 951
(1974).
12. Magnusson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of
1975, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982). The goal of this act is to facilitate "private enforcement of warranty rights by consumers .... " See Miller & Kanter, Litigation Under Magnusson-Moss. New Opportunities in Private Actions, 13 U.C.C. L.J. 10 (1980). "Consumer"
under the Act includes anyone who "buys a consumer product for purposes other than resale." See 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3) (1982).
13. See Cohan, The Rights and Duties of RetailMerchants Under State Consumer Protection Laws." Emergent Doctrinesand Strategies ofthe Defense, 18 NEw ENG. L. REV. 297,
298 n.2 (1982-1983) (Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, New York
Consumer Protection Act, Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act).
14. Interest-Consumer Credit and Consumer Protection Act, ch. 274, §§ 1-9, 1967
Tex. Gen. Laws, Gen. & Spec. 608, 608-60, amended by Act of June 10, 1969, ch. 452, §§ 1-3,
1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, Gen. & Spec. 1504, 1504-09.
15. See id § 2, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, Gen. & Spec. at 608-09, amended by Deceptive
Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, ch. 143, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, Gen. & Spec.
322, 322-43 (current version at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp.
1984)). In its declaration of legislative intent, the legislature made the following findings of
fact:
(1) Many citizens of our State are being victimized and abused in various types of
credit and cash transactions. These practices impose a great hardship upon the people
of our State.
(2) Credit in its various forms is one of the most essential and vital elements of our
economy. It can be truly said that credit affects every citizen every day. Credit transactions in our State amount to many billions of dollars per year.
(3) Credit abuses now existing in our State stem from the fact that many types of
credit transactions are now subject to effective public regulation and control and the
penalties imposed for usury do not provide effective or workable safeguards in this vital
area of economic activity.
(4) Such abuses are especially prevalent in the area of consumer transactions both
cash and credit. Unscrupulous operators, lenders and vendors, many of whom are transient to our State, are presently engaged in many abusive and deceptive practices in the
conduct of their businesses. These unregulated practices bring great social and economic hardship to many citizens of our State. They impose intolerable burdens on
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action to a commercially injured consumer. 16 In order to seek relief for his
injuries resulting from deceptive acts or practices, the consumer had to
avail himself of the common law action of fraud,' 7 which involves a complex burden of proof and the numerous defenses which pervade all common law actions.' 8 These inadequacies in consumer protection were

those segments of our society which can least afford to bear them-the uneducated, the
unsophisticated, the poor and the elderly.
(5) These facts conclusively indicate a need for a comprehensive code of legislation to
clearly define interest and usury, to classify and regulate loans and lenders, to regulate
credit sales and services, and place limitations on charges imposed in connection with
such sales and services, to provide for consumer education and debt counseling, to
prohibit deceptive trade practices in all types of consumer transactions, and to provide
firm and effective penalties for usury and other prohibited practices.
(6) It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this revision of Title 79 of the Revised
Civil Statutes of Texas, 1925, to protect the citizens of Texas from abusive and deceptive practices now being perpetrated by unscrupulous operators, lenders and vendors in
both cash and credit consumer transactions and to implement the mandate of Section II
of Article XVI of the Constitution of Texas which authorizes the Legislature to classify
loans and lenders, license and regulate lenders, define interest and fix maximum rates of
interest, and thus serve the public interest of the people of this State.
Id at 608-09.
16. See Woo v. Great Sw. Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1978, writ refd n.r.e.) (DTPA resulted from legislature's recognition of inadequacies
of common law remedies); see also McCarthy, An Analysis ofthe 1979 Texas Deceptive Trade
PracticesAct and Possible Ramifications of Recent Amendments." Is the Act Still Consumer
Oriented, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 885, 890 (1980). Private consumers could not avail themselves
of any injunctive relief; however, upon demand of the Consumer Credit Commissioner, the
Attorney General could enjoin persons engaging in unfair trade practices from continuing
those practices when they were violating the DTPA's "laundry list." See id at 888. In 1969,
this procedure was modified "to allow the Attorney General to independently seek injunctions against sellers engaging in deceptive practices." See id at 889. Compare InterestConsumer Credit and Consumer Protection Act, ch. 274, sec. 2, art. 10.04, 1967 Tex. Gen.
Laws, Gen. & Spec. 608, 658-59 (Consumer Credit Commissioner can request Attorney
General to bring action against persons engaging or about to engage in deceptive practices)
(amended 1969) (current version at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.47 (Vernon Supp.
1984)) with Interest-Consumer Credit and Consumer Protection Act, ch. 452, sec. 1, art.
10.04b, 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws, Gen. & Spec. 1504, 1506 (Attorney General may, on his own
initiative, bring action against persons engaging in, who have engaged in, or who are about
to engage in deceptive practices) (amended 1973) (current version at TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.47 (Vernon Supp. 1984)).
17. See McCarthy, An Analysis of the 1979 Texas Deceptive Trade PracticesAct and
Possible Ramifications of Recent Amendments: Is the Act Still Consumer Oriented 11 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 885, 890 n.30 (1980) (tort action of fraud was only remedy available to aggrieved consumer); see also Curry, The 1979 Amendments To The Deceptive Trade PracticesConsumer ProtectionAct, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 51, 52 (1980) (victim of deceptive practice is
limited to tort action of fraud or deceit).
18. See McCall v. Trucks of Texas, 535 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court stated:
To establish fraud it must appear that (I) a material representation was made; (2) it was
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alleviated by the 1973 enactment of the DTPA and its subsequent
amendments. 9
Under the DTPA, an aggrieved consumer can bring a "statutory cause
of action imposing strict liability for false, misleading or deceptive acts or
practices."" Furthermore, by providing for the possible recovery of treble

false; (3) when the representation was made, the speaker knew it was false or that he
made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; (4) the
speaker made the representation with the intention that it should be acted upon by the
party; (5) the party acted in reliance upon the representation, and (6) the party thereby
suffered injury.
/d at 794; see also Brady v.Johnson, 512 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no
writ) (elements of proof necessary to establish fraud); Curry, The 1979 Amendments To The
Deceptive Trade Practices-ConsumerProtectionAct, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 51, 52 (1980) (legal
and non-legal barriers to consumer protection); McCarthy, An Analysis of the 1979 Texas
Deceptive Trade PracticesAct and Possible Ramifications of Recent Amendments.- Is the Act
Still Consumer Oriented, II ST. MARY'S L.J. 885, 890 n.30 (1980) (injured plaintiff carried
heavy burden of proof at common law); Patton, Case Law Under the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices-ConsumerProtectionAct, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 533, 533 (1981) (common law actions
hampered by heavy burden of proof and many defenses).
19. Compare Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Texas Bank & Trust, 516 S.W.2d 138, 142-43
(Tex. 1974) (common law action of fraud requires proof seller's statement intended to be
relied on by purchaser) with Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Tex. 1978) (no
proof of intent to induce purchaser required under DTPA). See also Goodfriend & Lynn,
Of White Knights and Black Knights. An Analysis of the 1979 Amendments to the Texas
Deceptive Trade PracticesAct, 33 Sw. L.J. 941, 947-49 (1979). Some of the proscriptions
prior to the 1979 amendments contained requirements of knowledge or scienter, where
others required intent or fraud. See id.at 947. The injured consumer, since the 1979
amendment, now only has to show that the DTPA was "knowingly" violated by the defendant to recover treble damages, and he need not prove "scienter" to recover actual damages.
See id at 948. The DTPA, as originally enacted in 1973, has been subject to amendments in
1975, 1977, 1979, and 1983. See Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, ch. 62,
secs. 1,2, §§ 17.45, .54, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, Gen. & Spec. 149, 149 (current version at TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45 (Vernon Supp. 1984)), amended by Act of May 23, 1977,
ch. 216, §§ 1-14, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, Gen. & Spec. 600, 600-05 (amending §§ 17.45, .46(b),
(c), .47(a)-(d), .50(a), .56, .59, adding §§ 17.50A, .55A, and repealing §§ 17.51-.54 of DTPA)
(current version at TEX Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.45-.59 (Vernon Supp. 1984)),
amended by Act of June 13, 1979, ch. 603, §§ 1-10, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, Gen. & Spec. 1327,
1327-32 (amending §§ 17.43, .45, .46, .50, .50A, .50B,.56, and adding §§ 17.50B and .56A to
DTPA) (current version at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.43-.56A (Vernon Supp.
1984)), amended by TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
20. See McCarthy, An Analysis of the 1979 Texas Deceptive Trade PracticesAct and
Possible Rami'ications of Recent Amendments.- Is the Act Still Consumer Oriented, 11 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 885, 891 (1980) (consumer can bring private cause of action for damages); see
also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (aggrieved party must
be consumer in order to bring private cause of action); Woo v. Great Sw. Acceptance Corp.,
565 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (consumer merely has to
allege and prove factual causation of actual damages); Curry, The 1979 Amendments To The
Deceptive Trade Practices-ConsumerProtectionAct, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 51, 52 (1980) (remedy of fraud at common law replaced by statutory strict liability).
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damages, court costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees, 2 1 this statutory
scheme removes the economic barrier which hampered successful consumer protection prior to 1973.22 It also serves as an effective deterrent to
engaging in deceptive trade practices. 23 Despite its positive attributes, the
DTPA has been subject to several amendments, which have consistently
broadened its scope of protection.24

21. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b), (d) (Vernon Supp. 1984). It should
be observed, however, that:
[t]here are restrictions to the recovery of treble damages. Upon a simple showing that
an unlawful act occurred and that the act was a "producing cause" of actual damages,
the court must award an amount of damages consisting of actual damages plus twice
that portion of the actual damages that does not exceed $1,000. The trier of fact may
award not more than three times the amount of actual damages in excess of $1,000, but
only if it finds that the defendant "knowingly" committed an actionable violation of the
Act.
18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 369, 369 n.4 (1983) (quoting in part TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1984)) (citations omitted). In contrast, under art. 2 of the Texas
Uniform Commercial Code, a buyer can recover actual damages in a case of breach of
warranty, which are the difference at the time of the acceptance between "the value of the
goods and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted." See TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 2.714(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Further, under § 2.715(1), the
buyer can recover "incidental damages," which are expenses reasonably incurred and "incidental to the seller's breach." See id § 2.715(1); see also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 10-3, at 384 (2d ed. 1980). The code further provides that the buyer
can recover "consequential damages" which include "(1) any loss resulting from general or
particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason
to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and (2) injury
to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty." See TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 2.715(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Whether consequential damages
will be awarded to the buyer depends on whether the damages were foreseeable to the seller.
See Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 544 (1903) (consequential damages must have reasonably been in contemplation of parties when making contract); see also
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 10-4, at 388-90 (2d ed. 1980).
22. See Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 690 (Tex. 1980) (additional damage
recovery provides consumers with incentives to pursue their claims under DTPA); see also
Curry, The 1979 Amendments To The Deceptive TradePractices-ConsumerProtectionAct, 32
BAYLOR L. REV. 51, 52-53 (1980) (DTPA's provision for treble damages encourages litigation not likely initiated at common law).
23. See Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. 1980) (deterrence of violation of DTPA provided by additional liability over and above actual damages); see also
McCarthy, An Analysis of the 1979 Texas Deceptive Trade PracticesAct and PossibleRamFcations ofRecent Amendments." Is the Act Still Consumer Oriented, II ST. MARY'S L.J. 885,
892 (1980) (possible recovery of treble damages deters unscrupulous vendors); Patton, Case
Law Under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-ConsumerProtection Act, 33 BAYLOR L.
REV. 533, 533 (1981) (defendant and other sellers deterred from future violations).
24. See Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, ch. 62, sec. 1, § 17.45(1),
(4), 1975 Tex, Gen. Laws, Gen. & Spec. 149, 149 (extension of "goods" to include "real
property" and "consumer" to include "partnerships and corporations") (current version at
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1984)), amended by Act of May 23,
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This expansive trend caused the determination of who is protected
under the Act to become one of the most litigated issues of the DTPA.2 5
is delineated by the DTPA's definitions of
The class of' potential plaintiffs
"consumer, "26 "goods," 27 and "services." '28 As defined in the enactment of
1973, "consumer" was limited to "an individual who seeks or acquires by
1977, ch. 216, secs. 1, 6, §§ 17.45(2), .45(5), .50A, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, Gen. & Spec. 600,
600-05 ("for other than commercial or business use" deleted from "services"; "merchant"
deleted as exception to "consumer"; provision of certain defenses to treble damages) (current version at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.59 (Vernon Supp. 1984)), amended
byAct of June 13, 1979, ch. 603, secs. 1-10, §§ 17.43, .46(a), .50B, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws, Gen.
& Spec. 1327, 1327-32 (elimination of private cause of action under omnibus clause; limitation on compounding of penalties; addition of duty to disclose) (current version at TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.43-.56A (Vernon Supp. 1984)), amended by TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.45 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (exclusion of State of Texas or subdivision as business consumer; exclusion of business consumer with at least $25 million in assets; inclusion
of "commercial or business" in definition of business consumer).
25. See Patton, Case Law Under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-ConsumerProtection Act, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 533, 541 (1981).
26. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
"Consumer" means an individual, partnership, corporation, this state, or a subdivision
or agency of this state who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services,
except that the term does not include a business consumer that has assets of $25 million
or more, or that is owned or controlled by a corporation or entity with assets of $25
million or more.
Id There is a two-prong test to determine whether a purchaser has consumer standing
under the DTPA: (I) "the person must have sought or acquired goods or services by
purchase or lease," and (2) "the goods or services purchased or leased must form the basis of
the complaint." See Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex. 1981)
(both requirements must be satisfied, otherwise only common law remedy available).
27. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(1) (Vernon Supp. 1984). "'Goods'
means tangible chattels or real property purchased or leased for use." Id But see id § 2.105
(Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (definition of "goods" does not depend upon whether "goods"
are purchased or leased for use, but instead requires they be existing and identified). Under
art. 2 of the UCC, "goods" are "all things ... which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale" except money, investment securities and things in action; specifically included are "unborn animals," "growing crops," and "identified attachments to real
property." See id § 2.105(a). An important distinction between the definitions of "goods"
in the DTPA and in the UCC is that "real property" is excluded from the art. 2 definition.
See id. § 2.105(a). An even greater distinction can be observed between the DTPA definition
of "goods" and the UCC definition of "consumer goods." See id. § 9.109(i) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon Supp. 1984). "Consumer goods" are goods which are "used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes .... " See id § 9.109(1).
28. See id § 17.45(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984). "'Services' means work, labor, or service
purchased or leased for use, including services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods." Id § 17.45(2); see also Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 17376 (Tex. 1980) (in applying for loan plaintiff did not seek either "goods or services," therefore, not "consumer" for DTPA purposes); Patton, Case Law Under the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices-ConsumerProtectionAct, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 533, 545 (1981) (terms determine who can bring private cause of action).
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purchase or lease, any goods or services." 29 Even though the 1973 definition of "goods" did not expressly exclude "commercial or business use,"3
it was, nevertheless, interpreted to exclude this type of use from protection
under the DTPA due to the extension, by analogy, of the restrictive language in the definition of "services" to the definition of "goods."'" In
1977, the clause "for other than commercial and business use" was deleted
from the definition of "services, "32 so as to bring that definition in harmony with the definition of "goods., 33 In addition, "consumers" were no
due to the deletion of "merchant" as an
longer limited to nonmerchants
34
exception to "consumer."

29. See Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, ch. 143, § 17.45(4), 1973
Tex. Gen. Laws, Gen. & Spec. 322, 323 (amended 1975, 1977, 1979, 1983) (current version at
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1984)); see also D. BRAGG, P.
MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION § 2.01, at 30 (1983) (comparison
of "consumer" definitions under different amendments). The 1975 amendment added "partnership or corporation" to the definition of "consumer" and "real property" to that of
"goods." See Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, ch. 62, sec. 1, § 17.45(1),
(4), 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, Gen. & Spec. 149, 149 (amended 1977) (current version at TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(1), (4) (Vernon Supp. 1984)); see also Perrin, Standing to
Sue and the Damage Provision: Two Controversial and Dynamic Concepts Under the DTPA,
24 S. TEX. L.J. 207, 208 (1983) (1975 and 1977 amendments added partnerships, corporations and governmental entities to definition of consumer).
30. See Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, ch. 143, sec. 1,§ 17.45(1),
1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, Gen. & Spec. 322, 323 (amended 1975) (current version at TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(1) (Vernon Supp. 1984)). "Goods" was defined as "tangible
chattels bought for use." Id
31. See Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, ch. 62, sec. 1, § 17.45(2),
1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, Gen. & Spec. 149, 149 (amended 1977) (current version at TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984)). "Services" was defined as "work,
labor, and services for other than commercial or business use, including services furnished in
connection with the sale or repair of goods." Id.
32. See Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, ch. 216, sec. 1,§ 17.45(2),
1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, Gen. & Spec. 600, 600-05 (current version at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.45(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984)). The 1977 version of the DTPA defines "services" as
"work, labor, or service purchased or leased for use, including services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods." Id.
33. See Otto, Inc. v. Cotton Salvage & Sales, 609 S.W.2d 590, 594 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1980, writ dism'd) (1977 amendment intended to bring definition of "services" in harmony with definition of "goods").
34. See Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, ch. 143, sec. 1,§ 17.45(5),
1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, Gen. & Spec. 322, 323 (repealed 1977). Section 17.45(5) of the DTPA,
prior to the 1977 amendment, defined "merchant" as "a party to a consumer transaction
other than a consumer." Id. The 1977 amendment deleted the contents of § 17.45(5) and
replaced it with the definition of "unconscionable action or course of action." See TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(5) (Vernon Supp. 1984); see also Goodfriend & Lynn, Of White
Knights and Black Knights: An Analysis of the 1979 Amendments to the Texas Deceptive
Trade PracticesAct, 33 Sw. L.J. 941, 1004 (1979) (removal of definition of "merchant" from
DTPA); Perrin, Standing to Sue andthe Damage Provision: Two Controversial and Dynamic
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Even though these consecutive amendments have broadened the scope
of the DTPA, the legislature's failure to define "use" 3 5 has left partially
unanswered the question of who is protected under the Act. 36 The different interpretations of the word "use ' 37 have caused the Texas courts to be
divided on the issue of DTPA protection for a "purchaser for resale. ' 38
The 1980 decision of the federal district court in South Texas Irrigation
Systems v. Lockwood Corp.39 exemplifies the holdings of those courts
which have refused to find that a purchaser for resale is a "consumer"
within the meaning of the DTPA.4 ° In South Texas IrrigationSystems, the
plaintiff, an authorized dealer of the defendant's irrigation systems, was
denied recovery under the DTPA for the defendant's failure to pay its ad-

Concepts Under the DTPA, 24 S. TEX. L.J. 207, 208 (1983) (category of "merchant" deleted

as exception to "consumer").
35. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45 (Vernon Supp. 1984). The word "use"

in the definitions of "goods" and "services" is the only reference given to describe the instances under which goods and services are protected under the DTPA. See id § 17.45(1),
(2).
36. See Otto, Inc. v. Cotton Salvage & Sales, 609 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1980, writ dism'd) (since legislature did not define "use," ordinary meaning
of word and construction principles of DTPA apply); see also D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J.
LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION § 2.04, at 27 (2d ed. 1983) (meaning of "use" must
be derived from other sources since not defined in Act); Patton, Case Law Under the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 533, 554 (1981)
(since "use" not defined in Act, courts have differed as to whether resale is "use").
37. See, e.g., Otto, Inc. v. Cotton Salvage & Sales, 609 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tex. Civ.
App.--Corpus Christi 1980, writ dism'd) ("use" defined as "a method or manner of employment of property that consists in its employment, occupation, exercise or practice") (quoting
WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 978 (1965)); Beggs v. Texas Dep't of
Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 496 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1973, writ refd) ("use" defined as "to put or bring into action or service; to employ for or
apply to a given purpose") (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY
2012 (2d ed. 1970)); James Stewart & Co. v. Mobley, 282 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1955, writ ref d) ("use" defined as "to employ for accomplishment of a purpose; to
apply to one's service; to avail oneself of").
38. Compare Voss v. May, 646 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ
dism'd) (purchaser for resale of assets of automobile dealership denied DTPA protection)
with Bamujally v. MacDonough, 508 F. Supp. 574, 577 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (purchaser of soft
drinks in United States for resale in Saudi Arabia protected under DTPA); see also Perrin,
Standing to Sue and the Damage Provision: Two Controversial and Dynamic Concepts Under
the DTPA, 24 S. TEX. L.J. 207, 212-13 (1983) (courts divided as to whether purchase for
resale is "use"). Since statutes of other jurisdictions fail to precisely define key terms, a
conflict similar to that in Texas can be observed among certain states. See Cohan, The
Rights and Duties of Retail Merchants Under State Consumer Protection Laws:" Emergent
Doctrines and Strategies of the Defense, 18 NEW ENG. L. REV. 297, 299-300 (1982-1983)
(absence of precise definitions facilitates pursuit of diverse consumer protection goals).
39. 489 F. Supp. 256 (W.D. Tex. 1980) (diversity case applying Texas law).
40. See id at 259 (court determined only relevant fact is whether irrigation systems
were purchased for resale).
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vertised rebates. 4 ' Although the dealer argued that the term "use" was
broad enough to include goods purchased for resale, 42 the court upheld the
manufacturer's contention that in buying irrigation systems for resale the
plaintiff did not "consume" them,43 and, thus, the dealer was not protected
by the provisions of the DTPA. 4
Conversely, the decision of the Corpus Christi court of appeals in Otto,
Inc. v. Cotton Salvage & Sales 5 is representative of those cases in which
the courts have recognized that a purchase for resale is a "use," and that,
therefore, a purchaser for resale is a "consumer" under the DTPA.4 6 In
Otto, the plaintiff, who purchased cotton to be resold in Taiwan,4 7 was
allowed recovery under the DTPA for damages caused by the defendant's
delivery of cotton.4 8 The court recognized that in purchasing the cotton,
the purchaser used the cotton for his own purpose, which was resale for
profit, and that he, therefore, was a "consumer" within the meaning of the
DTPA.49 The Texas Supreme Court has recently settled the conflict illustrated by the decisions in Otto and South Texas IrrigationSystems.50
41. See id at 257 (recovery denied under DTPA because purchaser for resale not
"consumer").
42. See id at 258 (plaintiff argued "use" should be given "common and ordinary
meaning").
43. See id at 258 (consuming is not buying and reselling).
44. See id at 258; see also Voss v. May, 646 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1983, writ dism'd) (purchaser for resale of assets of automobile dealership denied DTPA
protection because court used case law rendered prior to current amendment); Ratcliff v.
Trenholm, 596 S.W.2d 645, 649 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (since consumer defined as " 'one who uses (economic) goods and so diminishes or destroys their [utility],'" court denied DTPA protection to person building residences for resale) (quoting Ex
parte MehIman, 75 S.W.2d 689, 690 (1934)), rev'd on other grounds, 646 S.W.2d 927 (Tex.
1983); Person v. Latham, 582 S.W.2d 246, 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (purchaser of land for resale could not recover under 1975 version of DTPA); Trial v.
McCoy, 553 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ) ( no recovery under
original version of DTPA where purchaser of antique pistol was merchant).
45. 609 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ dism'd).
46. See id at 595 (purchaser of cotton for resale not precluded from DTPA protection).
47. See id at 595 (purchase made to comply with preexisting contracts).
48. See id at 592 (plaintiff had to make settlements due to poor quality of cotton).
49. See id at 593-94; see also Bamujally v. MacDonough, 508 F. Supp. 574, 577 (S.D.
Tex. 1981) (purchaser of soft drinks in United States for resale in Saudi Arabia protected
under DTPA); Rotello v. Ring Around Prods., 614 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.) (since limited definition of "services" should not be
extended to that of "goods," commercial or business use is not excluded from DTPA);
Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. R.J. Reagan Co., 577 S.W.2d 341, 346 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (sale of roofing materials to be used on job protected under
1975 version of Act).
50. See Big H Auto Auction v. Saenz Motors, 665 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tex. 1984) (court
adopts holding in Otto). Compare Otto, Inc. v. Cotton Salvage & Sales, 609 S.W.2d 590, 595
(Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1980, writ dism'd) (purchase for resale is "use," therefore,
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In Big H Auto Auction v. Saenz Motors,5 the Texas Supreme Court
granted DTPA protection to a merchant who purchased goods for resale.5 2
Writing for the majority, Justice Campbell noted that since the cause of
action arose in 1978, the 1977 version of the DTPA should control to determine whether the plaintiff had standing to bring a cause of action under
the DTPA.5 3 The court found, however, that mere application of the
DTPA would not resolve the issue, because Saenz's standing as a consumer to sue under the DTPA depended upon the use for which the
automobiles were purchased, and the legislature failed to define "use."5 4
Therefore, in order to determine whether the legislature intended "use" to
include purchase for resale, the court studied the legislative history of the
DTPA5 5 and concluded that the intent was to remove "all possible restriction on the word use."' 56 Driven by the mandate of section 17.44 of the
DTPA that the Act "should be liberally construed,"" the court explicitly
rejected several definitions of the word "use" as applied in prior case
law.58 It determined that in order to achieve the underlying purposes of
purchaser for resale is "consumer") with South Texas Irrigation Systems v. Lockwood Corp.,
489 F. Supp. 256, 257 (W.D. Tex. 1980) (purchaser for resale is not consumer). In holding a
purchase for resale was a "use," the Texas Supreme Court expressly disapproved of the
contrary holding in Voss, in which writ was dismissed. See Big H Auto Auction v. Saenz
Motors, 665 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tex. 1984).
51. 665 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. 1984).
52. See id at 759 (purchaser for resale is "consumer").
53. See id at 757.
54. See id at 757 (legislature also failed to define scope of DTPA); see also Riverside
Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 178 (Tex. 1980) (definition of "service" ineffectively
defines term); Patton, Case Law Under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-ConsumerProtection Act, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 533, 554 (1981) ("use" not defined in DTPA).
55. See Big H Auto Auction v. Saenz Motors, 665 S.W.2d 756, 757-58 (Tex. 1984).
56. See id. at 757-58. When Senate bill 48 was introduced in 1975, adding the word
"final" to the definitions of "goods" and "services," a floor debate arose between Sen.
Mauzy and Sen. Meier as to whether the word "final" should be stricken from those definitions. See Debate on Tex. S.B. 48 on the Floor of the Senate, 64th Leg. 222-23 (Feb. 10,
1975) (transcript available from Senate Staff Services Office). The word "final" was deleted
following the testimony of G. Fondren of the Texas Automobile Dealers Association. See
id. at 222. Fondren stressed that if "use" was restricted to final use, automobile dealers
would lose standing to sue companies or individuals who sell products which are intended to
be sold to dealers' consumers. See The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-ConsumerProtection Act: Hearingson Tex. SB. 48 Before the Senate Human Resource Comm., 64th Leg. 2227 (Feb. 3, 1975), cited in D. BRAGoG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION § 2.01, at 30 (2d ed. 1983).
57. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
58. See Big H Auto Auction v. Saenz Motors, 665 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex. 1984); see also
Beggs v. Texas Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 496 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref d) ("use" means "to put or bring into action or service; to employ for or apply to a given purpose"); Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of
Dallas, 174 S.W. 636, 641 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1915, writ reed) ("use" means "to make
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the DTPA,59 a purchaser for resale, however, should be a "consumer"
under the DPTA.6 °
The Texas Supreme Court, in Big H, has settled a controversy which has
divided Texas courts for many years. 6 1 The court examined the legislative
history of the DTPA in order to effectuate the Act's underlying purpose.6 2
Under the 1973 enactment of the DTPA, and its 1975 amendment, commercial or business use of goods was implicitly excluded from protection.6 3

use of; to convert to one's own service; to put to a purpose; to hold, occupy, enjoy, or take the
benefit of'). The Big Hcourt rejected these narrow definitions and reaffirmed its holding in
Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. 1980), that "a court is not necessarily
confined to the literal meaning of the words used and that legislative intent rather than the
strict letter of the Act will control." See Big H Auto Auction v. Saenz Motors, 665 S.W.2d
756, 758 (Tex. 1984). Therefore, the court concluded that "to limit use" would be contrary
to the statutory mandate of § 17.44 on construction and application of the DTPA. See id at
758.
59. See Big H Auto Auction v. Saenz Motors, 665 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex. 1984). The
underlying purposes of the DTPA are "to protect consumers against false misleading and
deceptive business practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches of warranty and to provide efficient economical procedures to secure such protection." See id at 758.
60. See id.
at 759. The court specifically rejected all cases which held that a purchaser
for resale is not a consumer. See id at 759.
61. See id at 758 (court rejected all cases holding "a purchase for resale is not a use");
see also Jenkins, Attempting a Balance.- The 1979 Amendments to the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices-ConsumerProtectionAct, II TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 19-21 (1979) (1979 amendments
did not resolve issue "[wihether inventory is within the definition of 'goods' purchased or
leased for 'use' under Section 17.45(1)"); Perrin, Standing to Sue andthe Damage Provision:
Two Controversialand Dynamic Concepts Under the DTPA, 24 S. TEX. L.J. 207, 212 (1983)
(Texas courts are divided as to whether resale transactions fall within scope of DTPA).
62. See Big H Auto Auction v. Saenz Motors, 665 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex. 1984) (legislative intent should control determination of issue); see also United States Steel Corp. v. Fiberglass Specialties, 638 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1982, no writ) (quoting TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon Supp. 1984)). "This subchapter. . . shall be...
applied to promote its underlying purposes, which are to protect consumers against false,
misleading, and deceptive business practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches of warranty and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection." See
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
63. See Ratcliff v. Trenholm, 596 S.W.2d 645, 649 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ
refd n.r.e.) (definitions of "goods" and "services" allow inference that "purchase of goods
for commercial purposes" is "not within the contemplation of the DTPA"); D. BRAGG, P.
MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION § 2.01, at 32 (2d ed. 1983) (originally "use" employed to exclude goods and services purchased for business purposes); see
also Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, ch. 143, sec. 1,§ 17.45(1), (2), 1973
Tex. Gen. Laws, Gen. & Spec. 322, 323 (amended 1975, 1977) (current version at TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(1), (2) (Vernon Supp. 1984)). "[G]oods" were defined as "tangible chattels bought for use," and "services" as "work, labor, and services for other than
commercial or business use, including services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods." Id The original version of the DTPA covered only those particular goods
which were normally acquired "for personal, family, or household purposes." See D.
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The proposed 1975 amendment restricted the use of "goods" and "services" to use by "final" consumers, but this limitation was stricken from the
DTPA before its adoption. 6' Had the legislature intended to preserve this
narrow scope of the DTPA, then it would have included the term "final
use" in the 1975 definition of "goods" and "services. 6 5 By deleting the
word "final" from the 1975 proposed amendment, the legislature indirectly
expanded the scope of the DTPA to entities whose business it is to buy and
resell goods and services.6 6 When, in 1977, the "commercial or business"
exception was removed from the definition of "services," "goods or services acquired for any purpose" were brought within the application of the
DTPA.6 7 By excluding from protection "business consumers" with assets
in excess of 25 million dollars in the 1983 amendment, the legislature again
implicitly recognized that the DTPA applies to other non-excluded business consumers.68 The legislative history of the DTPA thus indicates that
"goods" not only relates to goods purchased for physical consumption, but
also to those purchased for resale.69 It appears, therefore, that the court's
decision is clearly in line with the legislative intent, which took ten years
to
70
mature, to encompass almost all levels of commercial transactions.

2.01, at 32 (2d ed.
1983).
64. See D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J.LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION § 2.01,
at 32 (2d ed. 1983) (use of "goods" and "services" limited to use "for personal, family, or
household purposes").
65. See id § 2.01, at 32.
66. See id § 2.01, at 32-33.
67. Compare Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, ch. 143, sec. 1,
§ 17.45(2), 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, Gen. & Spec. 322, 323 (commercial or business use excluded from "services") (amended 1975, 1977) (current version at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.45(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984)) with Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection
Act, ch. 216, sec. 1, § 17.45(2), 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, Gen. & Spec. 600, 600 (commercial or
business use not excluded from "services") (codified at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.45(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984)); see also D. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS
CONSUMER LITIGATION § 2.01, at 32 (2d ed. 1983). The enactment of the 1975 amendments
without the inclusion of "final" in the definitions of "goods" and "services" indicate the
legislative intent not to limit "use" to "final use." See id at 32.
68. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1984). The 1983
amendment did not affect the decision of the court because the cause of action arose under
the application of the 1977 version of the DTPA. See Big H Auto Auction v. Saenz Motors,
665 S.W.2d 756, 757 (Tex. 1984).
69. SeeD. BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION § 2.01,
at 33 (2d. ed. 1983) (since business entities were added to consumer, it would be illogical to
exclude purchase for resale).
70. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(1), (4) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (broad
definitions of "goods" and "consumers") and Big H Auto Auction v. Saenz Motors, 665
S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tex. 1984) (purchaser for resale "consumer" for DTPA purposes) with
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, ch. 143, sec. 1, § 17.45(1), (4), 1973
BRAGG, P. MAXWELL & J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION §
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The present decision of the Texas Supreme Court has departed from the
DTPA's initial purpose of protecting individuals from the effects of unequal bargaining power with merchant sellers. 7' The court has furthered
the legislative intent of broadening the scope of the DTPA, to the extent
that it now protects the commercial transactions between parties who are
not "consumers" within the strict meaning of the word. 72 This extension
entails the inevitable possibility of substantial liability at any level of the
market structure for a strict liability violation of a statute which offers very
few defenses. 73 A market participant will shift this potential liability to the
insurance company which will provide the best coverage for the lowest
price.7 ' The burden of such cost will unavoidably increase the overall cost
of doing business.75 In a free enterprise system, efficiency dictates that the
Tex. Gen. Laws, Gen. & Spec. 322, 323 (1973 version of DTPA contained narrow definitions
of "goods" and "consumers") and Trial v. McCoy, 553 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1977, no writ) (purchaser of antique pistol merchant under original Act, therefore not
consumer). The interpretation of the DTPA set forth in Big H establishes Texas as a forerunner in the area of consumer protection. See Big H Auto Auction v. Saenz Motors, 665
S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tex. 1984) (purchase for resale protected under DTPA); accordWilkinson
v. Smith, 639 P.2d 768, 770-73 (Wash. App. 1982) (purchasers of land for resale protected
under Unfair Business Practices-Consumer Protection Act, WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 19.86 (1978 & Supp. 1984-1985)). The state of consumer protection law in some jurisdictions remains similar to that of the 1973 version of the Texas DTPA, which limited consumer protection to goods acquired for other than business or commercial purposes. See,
e.g., Sumner v. Adel Banking Co., 259 S.E.2d 32, 34 (Ga. 1979) (notes not consumer transactions where loans and farm equipment obtained for farming business); PPG Indus. Can. v.
Kreuscher, 281 N.W.2d 762, 770 (Neb. 1979) (purchaser refers to ultimate consumer); Miller
v. Hubbard-Wray Co., 630 P.2d 880, 885 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (no consumer protection for
purchaser of bailer obtained for bailing hay to feed cattle). Other jurisdictions have adopted
a more liberal approach and have extended consumer protection to businessmen. See KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 50-624(b) (1976) (businessmen protected under Kansas consumer protection
act); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(h) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984) (businessmen can maintain private cause of action under local consumer protection statute). But see Musil v. Hendrich, 627 P.2d 367, 371-72 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (transaction between farmers not protected
because of equal bargaining position).
71. See 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 369, 370 (1983) (DTPA's initial purpose to protect against
unequal bargaining power).
72. See id at 370 (DTPA extended to commercial transactions).
73. See id. at 377 (DTPA strict liability statute). Under the DTPA, a prima facie violation is shown "when a false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice as defined in section
17.46 of the Act is a producing cause of actual damages to a consumer." See id at 377.
74. Cf. Comment, Continuing the Common Law Response to the New IndustrialState.The Extension ofEnterpriseLiability to ConsumerServices, 22 UCLA L. REV. 401,438 (1974)
(insurance is buffer against pressure of liability).
75. Cf. id. at 437. A "social cost" of a service is defined as "the current price plus the
additional increment of cost represented by the risk of non-negligent accidents." See id at
473; see also Steiner, The Legalization o/American Society: Economic Regulation, 81 MICH.
L. REV. 1285, 1302-03 (1983) (increased regulation perceived to increase cost of doing
business).
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prices of goods and services represent their "full social cost";7 6 therefore,
the cost increase will ultimately be passed on to the final consumer.77 In
order for this to be economically justified, the overall benefit to the community must outweigh the burden on the final consumer,
unless there is
78
some contrary independent and compelling policy.
When enacted, the DTPA was intended to remedy the problems caused
by the unequal bargaining power between consumers and business entities.
Efforts to protect only the "final" consumer, however, created an inherent
unfairness for certain market participants involved as purchasers for resale. A retailer, while liable to its consumers, was denied DTPA protection
for injuries resulting from its purchases from other market participants.
The recognition by the Texas Supreme Court that a purchase for resale is a
"use" under the DTPA has drawn the development of Texas consumer
protection to a rational conclusion. While granting a better protection to
merchants in their dealings with each other, however, this approach will
have far-reaching economic consequences which, in the final analysis, will
have to be borne by the ultimate consumer.
Vincent P. Dhooghe

76. See Comment, Continuing the Common Law Response to the New Industrial State.,
The Extension of Enterprise Liability to Consumer Services, 22 UCLA L. REV. 401, 436
(1974). When goods and activities reflect their social cost, which is the cost they impose on
society, then the "best product and activity mix" is achieved. See Calabresi, The Decision for
Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723 (1965).

The purpose behind social cost is deterrence against infringement. See id at 722.
77. See Comment, Continuing the Common Law Response to the New Industrial State.:
The Extension ofEnterprise Liability to Consumer Services, 22 UCLA L. REV. 401, 437 (1974)
(prices, including social costs, charged to purchasers); see also Steiner, The Legalization of
American Society. Economic Regulation, 81 MIcH. L. REV. 1285, 1303 (1983) (beneficiaries

of regulation pay cost directly).
78. SeeR. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 88, 93 (1981). Under the Pareto superiority doctrine, in order for one allocation of resources to be superior to another, at least
one person must be better off under the first than under the second, and no one can be worse
off. See id. at 88. Under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, it is sufficient that the increase in value

be large enough to fully compensate the loser. See id at 91.
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